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FROM SPACES OF EXCEPTION TO ‘CAMPSCAPES’: 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN 
BEIRUT 
Abstract 
The recent literature on the refugee condition and spaces has heavily drawn on Agamben’s reflection 
on ‘bare life’ and the ‘camp’. As refugees are cast out the normal juridical order, their lives are 
confined to refugee camps, biopolitical spaces that allow for the separation of the alien from the 
nation. But is the camp the only spatial device that separates qualified and expendable lives? What 
happens when the space of the camp overlaps with the space of the city? Taking the Palestinian 
refugee camp of Shatila in Beirut as a case, this study problematises the utilisation of legal prisms 
and clear-cut distinctions for the understanding of the production of bare life and spaces of 
exception. Isolated at the time of its establishment, Shatila is today part of the so-called ‘misery belt’. 
Physical continuities are also reflected by the distribution of the population as both Palestinians and 
non-Palestinians, including Lebanese, live in Shatila and the surrounding informal settlements. As 
physical and symbolic boundaries separating the refugee and the citizen blur, I argue that the 
exception is not only produced through law and its suspension. While legal exceptions place the 
Palestinians outside the juridical order, other exclusions run along sectarian and socio-economic lines 
cutting through the Lebanese body. As Shatila and the informal settlements are entangled, a new 
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spatial model of analysis defined as the ‘campscape’ is proposed. Once the exception leaks out of the 
space of the camp, the campscape becomes the threshold where the refugee, the citizen and other 
outcasts meet.  
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One of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics 
[...] is its constant need to redefine the threshold in life 
that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what 
is outside. [...] And when natural life is wholly included 
in the polis – and this much has, by now, already 
happened – these thresholds pass, as we will see, beyond 
the dark boundaries separating life from death in order 
to identify a new living dead man, a new sacred man. 
 
(Agamben, 1998:131) 
 
Introduction 
As a result of the first Arab-Israeli conflict between 1947 and 1948, more than 750,000 Palestinians 
were expelled or fled from their homes and villages (UNRWA, 2014a). About 100,000 found refuge in 
Lebanon where, after an initial welcome, they have faced multifaceted forms of marginalisation. This 
is due to the peculiar sectarian character of Lebanese politics. It registers the highest percentage of 
Christians among all Middle Eastern countries and a power-sharing formula between different sects 
characterises political life. The presence of a mostly Muslim refugee community constituting about 
ten percent of the total population in Lebanon, therefore, has always been perceived as a threat to 
the country’s delicate political order and stability (Haddad, 2000: 30). 
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The Lebanese government’s concerns over its population are manifested institutionally through the 
issue of laws, decrees and orders that prevent the Palestinians from enjoying the most basic rights 
such as the right to work and access to educational and health services; and spatially through the 
establishment of refugee camps. As laws, decrees and orders dictate the conceptual separation of 
the Palestinian refugee from the Lebanese citizen, refugee camps complete such distinction 
geographically preventing the Palestinians’ integration. 
As philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) would put it, the production of refugees’ ‘bare life’ – a life 
stripped of any right and value – and its spatialisation through the establishment of camps is not new 
to our times. Drawing a controversial parallel between the Nazi concentration camps and temporary 
structures such as refugee camps and detention centres, Agamben urges us to recognise the logic of 
exception pervading our societies. Conceived as ‘a piece of land that is placed outside the normal 
juridical order’, the camp has become the ‘hidden matrix’ of the modern political space and the 
technique of government to exclude, enclose and/or even eliminate those who threaten the security 
of the state (Agamben, 1998: 170). 
Recognising the invaluable contribution of Agamben in the understanding of biopolitics and 
exception in situations of refugeeness, this paper aims to further the reflection on the ways in which 
biopolitics may operate today and the ways in which the exception may be conceived and spatialised.  
While Agamben’s conceptualisation of the camp grounds this study, the spatialisation of exclusion is 
more nuanced because, of the 444,480 Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Lebanon, only 241,322 live in the twelve official refugee camps 
(UNRWA, 2014b). These figures are also reflected globally as the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that often refugees live in urban areas and that only one third of the 
10.4 million refugees worldwide, excluding the Palestinians, live in refugee camps (UNHCR, 2013: 6, 
8). It seems that the refugee population is more dispersed than sociologists or biopolitics theorists 
would expect them to be. Life in the camp for refugees does not constitute the norm. 
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In investigating the refugee condition and spaces, this paper focuses on Shatila refugee camp. 
Established far from the city centre in 1949, Shatila is now part of the urban texture of metropolitan 
Beirut and the city’s ‘misery belt’, an axis of low-income and informal settlements surrounding 
Beirut’s city centre. This urban condition is shared by other Palestinian camps in Lebanon and the 
Middle East and, as I suggest below, this complicates their construction as ‘exceptional’ spaces. 
Additionally, the high presence of non-Palestinians in Shatila, which includes Lebanese, Syrians, 
Turks, Egyptians, and Bangladeshis, problematises the clear-cut production and separation of bare 
and qualified lives, respectively and allegedly embodied by the figures of the refugee and the citizen. 
In light of the entanglement of the camp with the city and the lives of different outcasts, is it entirely 
true that the camp and the camp only could be the paradigmatic spatial device that divides the life 
worth living from the expendable life? What happens when the space of the camp begins 
overlapping with the space of the city? In contrast with the literature that looks at the camp in its 
isolation, this paper investigates the camp’s relation to the city and its informal settlements. While I 
do not suggest that the camp is fully integrated into the dynamics of the city, I argue that the camp 
inhabits an expanded version of the exception which includes non-refugees too. 
This paper, part of a broader research project on Palestinian refugees’ lives and spaces in Lebanon, is 
based on a combination of different qualitative methods. Fieldwork was undertaken between 
October 2008 and January 2009 and included ethnographic practices of observation and more than 
twenty semi-structured and in-depth interviews with Palestinian refugees and Lebanese citizens 
living in Shatila camp and the surrounding areas. The research also included archive and desktop 
research on the condition and status of refugee camps and informal settlements in Beirut. These 
literatures are pivotal for the understanding of the population that inhabits Beirut’s ‘misery belt’ and 
the development of informal settlements in the periphery and proximity of refugee camps. While 
research in the field started with a focus on the refugee camp only and the lives of the Palestinian 
refugees there, the field challenged research questions and assumptions. Encounters in the camp 
with Palestinians and Lebanese as well as the difficulty in identifying the limits of the camp revealed 
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blurred physical and conceptual boundaries that allegedly would separate citizens and non-citizens, 
and here the focus is on these blurred boundaries. 
Examining the complexities of the exception produced in Lebanon, this paper is divided into three 
sections. The first section provides the theoretical background. It explores the concepts of bare life 
and the space of exception and their applicability in situations of refugeeness with a glimpse into 
Palestinian refugees’ lives and spaces in Lebanon. The second part investigates the kind of biopolitics 
produced in Lebanon and examines the treatment of Palestinian refugees as well as Lebanese 
citizens. In the third section, the paper explores the exception spatially. From the establishment of 
Shatila refugee camp to the uncontrolled urbanisation of the 1950s and 1960s, it discusses the 
production of Beirut’s ‘misery belt’ and the merging of refugee spaces and informal urban 
settlements.  
In these sections, I argue that bare life is not only produced in legal terms as Palestinians are 
excluded from the benefits of citizenship, but is also rendered such through social and economic 
discourses and practices cutting through the Lebanese population and separating Lebanese lives that 
are worth living from those deserving the sovereign’s abandonment. While Agamben’s contribution 
to the understanding of the interactions between law, politics and life is indisputable, a partial 
disengagement from law is crucial if we are to explain the physical and symbolic proximity of 
refugees and citizens. Embracing processes and transformation occurring beyond the realm of law, 
Foucault (1997: 300) argued that: 
If you try to analyse power not on the basis of freedom, strategies and governmentality, 
but on the basis of the political institution, you can only conceive of the subject as a subject 
of law. One then has a subject who has or does not have rights, who has had these rights 
either granted or removed by the institution of political society; and all this brings us back 
to a legal concept of the subject. 
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Legal distinctions alone cannot fully capture the complexities of life, forms of lives and their 
spatialisations. While the paper draws heavily on the theory of exception and exclusion, the 
discussion of biopolitics and the ways in which it operates is also inspired by Foucault’s 
understanding of biopower and the abandonment of models of analysis exclusively based on law and 
rights (Foucault, 1998, 2003). 
To describe the increasing propinquity of the refugees and some citizens, as well as the impossibility 
of identifying the space of exception solely within the camp boundaries, such blurred distinctions are 
conceptualised through a new spatial model of exception. Borrowing from Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) 
understanding of modernity that focuses on continuities, the paper argues that bare life and the 
exception exceed the boundaries of the refugees’ bodies and spaces to include the citizens and other 
outcasts in the formation of what I term the ‘campscape’. The case of Shatila and other Palestinian 
refugee camps in the Middle East show how the model of the camp as proposed by Agamben cannot 
capture the complexities of the exception and its spatialities.  
While refugee spaces are established as temporary measures to prevent integration and to wait for a 
solution to refugeeness to be found, they are increasingly becoming permanent solutions. Born as 
spaces that freeze their inhabitants’ status and condition, camps turn their temporariness into a 
‘transient permanency’ in which camps may evolve over time, expand or even turn into city-like 
structures and in which life continues and where refugees and inhabitants reproduce their own 
normality (Agier, 2002, 2011).  
From concentration camps to Shatila refugee camp 
Although geographers have used the concept of biopolitics and its spatialisation in different ways 
and have been influenced by certain thinkers over others (see Coleman and Grove, 2009), Agamben’s 
theory of exception has greatly influenced the ways in which we look at refugees, immigrants and 
those placed outside the national political community. It was Michel Foucault who first coined the 
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term biopolitics to indicate the inclusion of life in the mechanism of power. For him, biopolitics 
emerged in the seventeenth century when power’s concerns began focusing on the population as a 
whole, conceived as a political, scientific and biological problem (Foucault, 1998, 2003). 
Though deeply indebted to Foucault, Agamben’s (1998, 2005) take on biopolitics differs in the ways 
in which power is conceptualised. According to Agamben, biopolitics is not a modern phenomenon, 
as ever since ancient times the main task of the sovereign has been to produce and separate lives 
worth living – thus included in the normal juridical order and protected – from bare lives – excluded 
from the juridical order at the point of being killable with impunity. The distinction between the life 
worth living and the one deserving abandonment is also reproduced spatially. As the norm is never 
applicable to ‘chaos’, the ‘where’ of its applicability must be localised (Minca, 2007). If historically the 
city has constituted the paradigmatic space of social and political life, its walls have marked the 
beginning of civilisation, where political space was divided from the state of nature (Diken, 2005). 
The erection of the fence, therefore, is the originary gesture that creates both order and disorder, 
law and its suspension, political space and space where the normal juridical order does not apply 
(Schmitt, 2003). 
Although, according to Agamben, biopolitics has a long history, the overarching development of the 
modern era is that bare life has penetrated the political space and that the space of exception, where 
bare life is hidden and confined, has come to coincide with the qualified space of the polis. In 
particular, in the context of the nation-state and with discourses on race and racial purity, newborn 
western democracies have turned foreigners into ‘biological threats’ to the national community and 
space. The advent of ‘state racism’ found its most brutal form in Nazi Germany as, in its effort to 
protect the Germanic race, it systematically segregated and even eliminated all categories of people 
that it deemed unsuitable for integration into the national political body (Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 
2003). 
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The penetration of bare life into political space is today represented by the presence of immigrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers who ‘spoil’ and ‘contaminate’ the harmony of the nation. As the trinity 
of localisation (Territory), order (State) and birth (the Nation) can no longer be held together without 
disruptions, new geographies of exception become the hidden matrix of modern political space. 
While they regulate and order our societies, refugee camps and detention centres work as purifying 
filters of the nation (Bigo, 2007; Diken and Laustsen, 2005; Perera, 2002; Rajaram, 2007; Rajaram and 
Grundy-Warr, 2004).  
As refugee camps are ‘a form of geopolitical humanitarianism that has as its “core business” the 
preservation of the value of the nation-state’ (Lui, 2002), it is not surprising that this humanitarian 
intervention and solution was also applied in 1948 when more than 750,000 Palestinians became 
refugees. In Lebanon, where they encountered the harshest conditions because of the particular 
sectarian system, refugee camps were soon established. With the excuse of gathering the refugees 
to provide humanitarian assistance, Palestinians were forced to move to the camps, either by the 
Lebanese authorities or by circumstances dictated by their precarious livelihoods (Peteet, 2005). 
While the Lebanese authorities wished to establish camps far from inhabited areas to prevent the 
integration of the Palestinians and reduce the chances of interactions with the Lebanese, most of the 
official camps and locations have been dictated by refugees’ early settlements and needs such as 
proximity to job opportunities. Shatila refugee camp was established in 1949 by refugees themselves 
as they decided where to settle by securing the land in an empty spot not far from Beirut. Only later 
did the International Committee of the Red Cross officialise the status of the camp (Sayigh, 1994). As 
Ahmad, a Palestinian refugee in his 80s whom I met in Shatila during my fieldwork, said: 
[...] In Adloun I worked in the field, I didn’t like this kind of job, so we moved to Beirut. 
There were some refugees in the park. We asked about the owner of this empty spot, his 
name was Abdallah Saleh, but the person in charge was Basha Shatila […] People staying in 
the park, like Abu Kamal and Abu Zaarour, went to him and asked for his permission. They 
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complained about their bad situation. He told them that the owners of the land are Saad’s 
family, they live in Brazil… But since he is the responsible, and the representative of the 
landlord, he allowed them to move there (Interview with Ahmad, December 2008). 
Although refugees managed to dictate the location of their camp, life in Shatila and other refugee 
camps in Lebanon was not easy. In the first twenty years of their residency in Lebanon, the 
Palestinians experienced the harshest oppression. To better monitor the refugees’ activities and 
guarantee their isolation, offices of police and intelligence services were placed in the camps and 
refugees became the objects of intimidation, arbitrary abuses and even torture (Sayigh, 1994).  
If at the beginning refugees in Lebanon met violence and control at the hands of the Lebanese 
authorities, things changed dramatically in 1969 when the Lebanese government and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed the Cairo Agreements. These accords gave the Palestinians the 
right to train in Lebanon for the liberation of their homeland. But most important of all, they 
permitted the Palestinians to self-administer their spaces. While in the early years of their presence 
in Lebanon Palestinians were prevented from expanding their camps and building what would have 
created a sense of permanency, from 1969 on refugees began constructing with concrete two or 
more storey buildings and expanding the camp beyond its boundaries. This is the moment at which 
the camp started meeting the informal settlements and the ever expanding ‘misery belt’. 
Producing bare life in Lebanon 
According to informal statistics collected at the UNRWA office in Beirut during fieldwork, about thirty 
percent of Shatila’s population is non-Palestinian. The presence of Lebanese and other foreigners 
such as Syrians, Egyptians and Bangladeshis in the camp urges a reflection on the kind of biopolitics 
that is at stake in Lebanon. If we follow Agamben’s understanding of biopolitics – that is, the 
production of bare life as a result of a legal abandonment – at first glance the Palestinian refugees, 
because of their statelessness, are the only group excluded from the protection of the state. Yet, this 
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understanding does not seem to capture the complexity of the exception and exclusion as applied in 
Lebanon.  
With regard to the Palestinians, not all of them were treated the same way. Not all of them were 
forced to live in refugee camps and were prevented integration into Lebanese society and economy. 
The sectarian character of Lebanese politics played a significant role in the ways in which Palestinians 
were treated. According to the 1932 census, the largest community within Lebanon was the 
Maronite Christian sect, followed by Sunni Muslims and Shi’a Muslims. This meant that key positions, 
such as the Presidency of the Republic, have since then been granted to Maronites while the offices 
of Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament have been given to Sunnis and Shi’ites respectively. The 
maintenance of the demographic, and therefore political, status quo led to a well-planned 
fragmentation of the Palestinian body. Along with national and non-national distinctions, sectarian 
and class patterns have also guided spatial, social and political distinctions. Profits in economic terms 
and advantages in the political arena were the Lebanese government’s concerns in the 
implementation of policies that included some Palestinians and excluded others.  
The Palestinian middle and upper classes have never known life in the camps. The most well-to-do 
Palestinians, especially the Christians, were allowed to settle in the cities and integrate into Lebanese 
society while their capital was absorbed and invested in new businesses and companies. Due to their 
money and wealth, upper class Palestinians were welcomed as they offered the prospect of an 
invaluable economic and financial contribution to the Lebanese economy. The confessionalisation of 
the Palestinian body became even more obvious as between the 1950s and 1970s some 28,000 
Christian Palestinians were encouraged to obtain Lebanese citizenship in the government’s attempt 
to counterbalance the rampant growth of the Muslim population (El-Natour, 1993: 42). 
While national belonging was a primary factor that separated the Palestinians from the Lebanese, it 
was not an exclusive one. Confessional and financial patterns were also arbitrarily applied in order to 
divide those worth protecting and integrating from those whose exclusion was essential. If we 
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extend the concept of biopolitics, distancing its definition from a purely legal understanding to 
include other forms of abandonment and exclusion, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not the 
only ‘banned’. Fawaz and Peillen (2002: 4) reported that since the end of the civil war more than 
twenty-five percent of the Lebanese population ‘lives below the poverty line’, while ‘25.8 percent of 
individuals [...] in Beirut earn less than US$106/month’. Though Lebanese poverty has been 
aggravated by the massive displacement and destruction caused by the civil war (1975-1990), looking 
at the root of the Lebanese citizenship illustrates how economic and sectarian concerns have always 
had the upper hand in the decision-making process that shaped Lebanon as a state and its 
population. 
The 1932 census, which played a crucial role in the determination of Lebanese politics, has always 
been highly contested because of its distinction of who could be considered a Lebanese citizen and 
who had to be excluded. Maktabi (1999) questions the ways in which the data in the census were 
obtained and, in doing so, illustrates inconsistencies that ultimately determined citizenship or lack 
thereof. Differences in the selection of criteria between the first census of 1921 and the one of 1932 
changed the ways in which citizenship could be granted, and along with it, the right to vote. While 
the 1921 statistics had only an administrative purpose, Resolution 2825 issued on 30 August 1924 
determined that all the former Ottoman subjects residing in Greater Lebanon would, on that date, 
become Lebanese citizens. Hence, presence on territory at that time was the essential requirement. 
However, these provisions changed in 1932 when a new census recounted the Lebanese residing in 
Lebanon and also included the emigrant population that was not considered previously. On the one 
hand, many residents in Lebanon, primarily Muslims, were denied citizenship after the 1932 census 
because they lacked proper documentation that proved their residence there for generations. On the 
other hand, priority was granted to Christians, whether they were emigrants living elsewhere or 
newly arrived such as Armenians fleeing persecution in Turkey. Christian communities were 
definitively favoured at the expenses of their Muslim counterparts. For instance, Kurdish refugees, 
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mostly Muslim, were never granted the same rights as the Armenians, Chaldeans or members of 
other Christian sects that settled in Lebanon. These ‘adjustments’ were aimed at maintaining the 
Christian demographic majority and, as a consequence, political supremacy (Maktabi, 1999). 
Yet, as distinctions are never drawn once and for all, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are 
constantly produced. What once was included formally – those having acquired Lebanese citizenship 
by virtue of birth – could be excluded informally later on through acts of political and economic 
abandonment. A complex redefinition of the threshold separating the one protected by the 
sovereign and the one abandoned must therefore be reworked on economic, political and social 
lines. While officially Lebanese nationals are protected by their state, unofficially the sectarian and 
neoliberal system of the country (see below) redraws lines of inclusion and exclusion.  
It is no wonder that refugee populations and the more marginalised among the Lebanese might end 
up living in and sharing the same spaces. In our encounter in Sabra, Fadi, a Lebanese man married to 
a Palestinian, told me his story of coexistence and solidarity with the Palestinians as he was born and 
raised in Shatila (Interview with Fadi, December 2008). His account shows how difficult and 
problematic it is to draw the boundary between him and his neighbours. This is not only because he 
married a Palestinian and even joined the resistance in Fatah ranks, but also because being 
Palestinian or Lebanese seemed not to make much difference. Not in social and economic terms, as 
some Lebanese and Palestinians share the same condition. Not in the political value of his family’s 
and his own life as he lost his father during the massacre of Sabra and Shatila in 1982 when Christian 
militias attacked the refugee camp and its surroundings as revenge for the assassination of president 
Bachir Gemayel for which Palestinian factions were suspected of being responsible. Sharing the same 
spaces and conditions blurred national boundaries that allegedly separate the refugee from the 
citizen. In such circumstances, the lives of Lebanese who were living side by side with the 
Palestinians became expendable and killable too. 
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 The camp meets the city: The production of Beirut’s ‘misery belt’ 
It is often argued that the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) was the product of sectarian tensions 
between the different religious communities in Lebanon. What is less often argued is that sectarian 
tensions were the product of socio-economic injustices and exclusions that date back to the period of 
the French Mandate (1920-1943) (Traboulsi, 2007). While the seeds of Lebanon’s sectarian, 
economic and political structure were planted in the period of early Ottoman domination, when 
different sects confronted each other over political and socio-economic privileges, the 
institutionalisation of the sectarian system came with the French domination and the arbitrary 
creation of Greater Lebanon in 1921. To the rich province of Mount Lebanon, mainly inhabited by 
Druze and Christian sects, the provinces of the South, the North, the Bekaa Valley and the coastal 
cities of Beirut, Saida, Tyre and Tripoli mainly inhabited by Muslims were annexed. Inequalities were 
exacerbated as taxation coming from the newly annexed territories was mainly spent and invested 
on Mount Lebanon. Under the pressure of the French, banking and trading soon flourished at the 
expense of the agricultural and industrial sectors (Traboulsi, 2007). 
With the formal independence of the country in 1943, the Lebanese presidency, held by the 
Maronite community, became ‘the main pole of attraction for the country’s dominant economic 
interests’ as the main economic activities in the countries were controlled by some thirty families 
pivoting around the figure of Bechara Al-Khouri, the first Lebanese president (Traboulsi, 2007: 115). 
As Christian members of this oligarchy controlled banks, agricultural and industrial production and 
the whole service system comprising transport, water and electricity companies, Muslims, and in 
particular Shi’ites, were left in an inferior position.  
While Lebanon experienced unprecedented economic growth in the immediate post-independence 
period, the benefits were not distributed equally as profits tended to be concentrated in Beirut and 
in the area of Mount Lebanon, exacerbating sectarian inequalities and divisions. The development of 
Beirut as the financial centre of the Middle East that started under the auspices of the French was 
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continuing at the expense of the countryside. While Beirut was developed through plans aimed at 
improving its infrastructure, its road and transportation systems, and its real estate and construction 
sectors, little investment was directed toward the agricultural sector and the Lebanese in rural areas 
were left with no services. In the 1960s the south still had no running water, electricity, hospitals or 
schools as even basic services were a luxury for the few. The country’s liberal economic system 
reserved just 0.7 percent of the state budget for the South which was inhabited by twenty percent of 
the country’s population (Sayigh, 1994: 162). 
This was the climate when, at the beginning of the 1950s, waves of Lebanese left their homes in 
search of fortune and better conditions in Beirut. The urbanisation of the country was of such 
explosive and uncontrollable proportions that migrants began pouring into the periphery of the 
capital populated by former Armenian refugee camps and neighbourhoods, as well as Palestinian 
refugee camps. What later came to be called Beirut’s ‘misery belt’ seemed to follow an axis drawn 
around the capital along a line starting in the eastern part of city from the former Armenian camp of 
Medawar in Quarantina, proceeding towards the Palestinian camps of Tell El-Zaatar, Jisr El-Basha and 
Dbayeh and stretching towards the western part of Beirut to include the camps of Shatila, Mar Elias 
and Burj El-Barajneh (Salibi, 1976). The explosion of informal settlements made villages around the 
capital become the natural extension of its centre while refugee camps, not isolated any longer, 
began touching the city. As informal settlement mushroomed, the ‘misery belt’ became the 
threshold where the camp and the city met. So while biopolitical imaginations may depict the camp 
as an isolated space, well demarcated and impermeable, this does not reflect the reality on the 
ground. 
The concentration of informal settlements in areas with a high presence and density of refugee 
communities is not limited to the period following the 1950s. Beirut refugee camps and 
neighbourhoods had welcomed rural migrants on other occasions too as Armenian and Syriac camps 
established in the 1920s in the eastern part of the city became the first poles of attraction for those 
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in need of cheap accommodation (Fawaz and Peillen, 2002). As Armenians began abandoning their 
camps, spaces were filled by Lebanese leaving the countryside and foreign migrants such as Kurds 
and Syrians. If the Armenian refugee camps provided shelter for other kinds of migrants, so did the 
Palestinian refugee camps of the capital as non-Palestinians settled within their boundaries or in 
their proximity. 
Especially after the Cairo Agreement (1969) that allowed the Palestinians to self-administer the camp 
(see above), the lands around Shatila began being populated by new settlers that included 
Palestinians and Lebanese citizens. Although, officially, refugee camps cannot expand, the quarters 
of Sabra and Hay Gharbeh, respectively north and west of the camp, became the natural extensions 
of Shatila (Clerc-Huybrechts, 2008). The presence of services such as health care and job 
opportunities, provided by the Palestinian organisations and open to anyone in need, also 
contributed to the growth of the area and informal settlements.  
As Fawaz and Peillen (2002) suggest, the north-eastern part of the ‘misery belt’ attracted those in 
search of jobs in the industrial sector while the western side constituted an appealing destination as 
the construction sector was developing around major projects such as the Sport City Stadium, Beirut 
International Airport and the Gulf Club. Urban planning focused on the development of luxurious 
residential areas, so that, on the eve of the civil war, some 40,000 to 50,000 high standard 
apartments in the whole of Beirut were left empty while the demand for low-cost housing was never 
satisfied (Clerc-Huybrechts, 2008: 42; Trabousli, 2007: 160). By the early 1970s the inhabitants of the 
shantytowns were mostly, although not exclusively, Shi’ites who were economically and socially 
marginalised. Forced to share the same neglected and forgotten urban spaces because of 
overcrowding, poor sanitation and health conditions, and a scarcity of services such as water and 
electricity, poor Lebanese and the Palestinians also shared the feeling of abandonment and 
vulnerability.  
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As one of the reasons for the breakout of the civil conflict was the extreme deprivation of certain 
layers of society, a meticulous ‘sectarianisation’ of reconstruction projects was also applied in the 
1980s. Maronite enclaves were privileged over the overcrowded southern suburbs of the city hosting 
mainly Muslims, and over the south of the country whose agricultural production and means of 
livelihood were destroyed by repeated Israeli attacks and invasions. In metropolitan Beirut, the 
Lebanese government allocated LL100 million for a new sewage system in the region of North Metn 
housing some 150,000 people while only LL30million was spent in the southern suburbs with some 
700,000 inhabitants (Sayigh, 1994: 135). 
These polices of exclusion in reconstruction were continued after the end of the civil war. While 
major efforts were put in the heavily contested reconstruction of the financial district to attract 
foreign investment by providing an economically stable facade for the country (Gavin, 1998), the 
rehabilitation of the suburbs and its inhabitants has yet to be completed. Low-cost housing has never 
been provided and the displaced continue solving their accommodation needs by expanding informal 
settlements (Salam, 1998). 
In Lebanon, biopolitical concerns do not run along national or citizenship tracks only. If primary 
distinctions based on law, rights and citizenship separate the Palestinians from the Lebanese, 
secondary distinctions cut through the very Palestinian and Lebanese bodies. While the camp is the 
spatial device that contains the threat and separates the refugee from the citizen, this technology of 
power may lose its effectiveness and function over time. As sectarian, political and economic 
interests produce other outcasts, refugee camps and informal settlements become thresholds where 
the refugee meets the citizen. 
The production of the ‘campscape’ 
Palestinian refugees are not the only ‘bare lives’ in Lebanon. Spatially this is manifested through the 
blurring of boundaries separating Shatila from its outside. In place of clear-cut fences Beirut is 
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characterised by ‘disjunctive orders’ that divide spaces and peoples. Rather than looking at the camp, 
it may be more appropriate to focus on the ‘campscape’. As Arjun Appadurai (1996: 33) suggests: 
 [t]he suffix –scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes [...] These terms with the 
common suffix -scape also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that look 
the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival 
constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts 
of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational 
groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or economic), and even intimate 
face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighbourhoods, and families. 
The suffix –scape gives the idea of fluidity, of something elastic. It indicates dispersal and non-static 
boundaries. The notion of campscape seems to better render the image of what is the refugee camp 
today in its relation with its surroundings as the exception has transcended the camp’s shape. 
Today the difference between Shatila and its outside is barely perceptible as many Palestinians also 
live outside Shatila’s official boundaries. No fence or wall surrounds Shatila and, as it appears today, 
the camp has only one net on its northern side with multiple points of access. The rest of the camp is 
open and boundaries are represented by streets that are wider than the narrow alleys within it. It is 
precisely this openness and lack of control that facilitated the increase of the camp’s population.  
The camp is not an exclusive Palestinian space. Some Lebanese have been living there because of 
intermarriages as it emerged during interviews and informal encounters. People who moved to the 
camp in the last twenty years are internally displaced by the civil war (both Palestinians and 
Lebanese), and Lebanese citizens and other migrants who moved to Beirut in search of better 
opportunities and who found accommodation in the camp cheaper than other areas of the city. Out 
of a population of about 12,000 to 13,000 people, unofficial UNRWA statistics, collected during 
fieldwork, estimate that some thirty percent of the camp population is non-Palestinian including 
Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians and other Arab and non-Arab nationalities. 
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If before the civil war, members of one family used to occupy an entire building, today the housing 
patterns inside the camp are changing. As the camp develops vertically, new constructions are seen 
as opportunities for income as the refugee camp, maintaining its exceptionality, develops its own 
economy and rules. As Salah, a Palestinian I interviewed, and Zahra, the social worker accompanying 
me during my encounters in Shatila, explained, a person interested in building must seek approval 
from the owner of the top flat whose permission costs between 2,000 – 3,000 US dollars. The roof of 
the top flat is then turned into the floor of the new house and in this way the construction process 
continues (Interview with Salah, November 2008). 
For Palestinians and non-Palestinians moving to the camp there is also the option of renting a room, 
renting an entire flat or buying a property. As a member of the Popular Committee of Shatila 
suggested, although officially these kinds of transactions are not allowed in the camp as refugees do 
not own the land on which the camp was established, these are to be seen as the development of 
informal and more flexible economies that allow the population of the camp to make some profit 
and the newcomers to find a cheaper accommodation (Interview with member of the Popular 
Committee, December 2008). Salah, in fact, told me that when his father moved to the camp in the 
1970s he could not afford to buy an entire flat. So he bought one big room only and rented the rest 
of the house. Today, he and his family own the entire five-storey building in which they live. To 
increase their income, he told me, “We are letting the ground floor. The tenant is Syrian” (Interview 
with Salah, November 2008). Similarly, Doraï (2011), in his research on the Mar Elias refugee camp 
(Beirut) and the urban dynamics in which the camp is embroiled, explains how Palestinians 
compensate for the lack of income by building more floors on the top of their roofs and renting to 
new residents for some $100-150 a month. In this way they compete with other more expensive 
areas of Beirut by ‘playing’ with the exception. From a space in which the alien is kept far from the 
national body, the refugee camp turns into a space that welcomes all the categories of people 
banned from the qualified life of the city. 
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Because of their prolonged existence, Beirut’s refugee camps seem to have lost their temporary 
character and to have become more permanent solutions that host refugees as well as other 
outcasts of the Lebanese system. On the one hand, this permanency is materialised through the 
utilisation of solid materials such as cement for construction. On the other, the logic of emergency 
typical of refugee spaces or urban informalities is maintained through construction and vertical 
expansions which lack planning. Occupying a temporality between temporariness and permanency, 
Beirut’s refugee camps today inhabit ‘a “frozen transience”, an ongoing, lasting state of 
temporariness, a duration patched together by moments none of which is lived through as an 
element of, and a contribution to, perpetuity’ (Bauman, 2002: 345). Yet, the high percentage of non-
refugees in Shatila leads us to consider the camp under a different light. 
As Nigel Thrift (2006) reminds us, space must be addressed as a process and not as a frozen 
materiality. It is never static, but is always in constant motion and fluid. Hence, even in the refugee 
camp understood as the permanent spatialisation of the exception, we witness a development of the 
camp’s physical features with construction in concrete that replaces tents. More importantly, the 
role and function of the camp may change too. In this sense the camp could be seen as a space in 
potentiality (Agamben, 1999). It can become a space of abjection in the Agambenian understanding 
and, therefore, a technology of power aimed at the elimination of the biological threat as happened 
with the concentration camps in Nazi Germany. But this potential actualisation and transformation 
into a death factory is only one among other possibilities. The camp can also turn into other more 
positive and productive spaces (see also Ramadan, 2012; Sanyal, 2011). The ways in which the camp 
can transform and develop are ‘decided’ by the sovereign, but, along with him, by the context, 
circumstances and the people acting on, inhabiting or surrounding it. 
As regards the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and in particular the camps that are today part 
of metropolitan Beirut, I argue that the state of exception is permanent. However, what is excepted 
changes over time and circumstances as Shatila, like other camps in the city, welcomes different 
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kinds of banned and the ‘human waste’ of the Lebanese system. The camp is, therefore, converted 
into a space that not only provides cheap solutions for those who cannot afford to live anywhere else 
in the city, but can also provide a safe haven for those who need to hide and remain in the shadow.  
In 1987 the Lebanese government abrogated the Cairo Agreements that allowed the Palestinians to 
self-administer their spaces. However, Lebanese authorities are still not controlling the camps from 
within. From a technology of control in the hands of state authorities as it was in the past, the camp 
has been turned into a technology of invisibility by the same subjects that the sovereign intends to 
exclude. As the banned exploit the space’s exceptional legal status, foreigners can hide from the 
police and the state in the event that they overstay their visa terms. By the same token, the camp is 
an exception not only in terms of rights as it hosts those stripped of any protection. The camp itself 
becomes a finer form of resistance as duties such as taxation are excepted too (Howe, 2005). As the 
very exception that once produced bare life might be transformed into a form of resistance, the 
development of informal economies in the camp must be seen as a coping strategy that exploits the 
exceptionality of this space and the Lebanese authorities’ disengagement. 
However, this degree of flow and freedom of movement is not allowed in camps outside 
metropolitan Beirut. While after the civil war checkpoints were a main feature of the refugee spaces 
and the Lebanese landscape more generally, in the 1990s controls were dramatically reduced in 
Beirut but never eased in the camps of the south of the country because of their proximity to the 
border with Israel and the need for more control. So while the camps of the south must be seen as 
closed spaces (Hanafi, 2008), Beirut’s camps are closer to the centre of power and, for this reason, a 
form of control may be exercised indirectly by such proximity (Interview with Jaber Suleiman, 
January 2009). However, the Lebanese authorities’ disengagement has led to the natural expansion 
of the camp and the impossibility of distinguishing physically and also symbolically the camp from 
what lies outside. If state authorities wanted to control the outcasts of the system, it would be 
difficult to locate security checkpoints nowadays since the refugee population is dispersed also in 
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informal gatherings around the camps and in other neighbourhoods such as Said Ghawash, Daouq, 
Sabra, and Hay El-Gharby all located in the south-west part of the city (Abbas et al., 1997). Indeed, 
the expansion of the alleged threat, embodied by the Palestinians refugees, the deprived Lebanese 
and immigrants, would render surveillance of these areas extremely difficult as the exception seems 
to have ‘leaked out’ of the camp to also include the ‘slum’. To protect economic and political 
activities, security checks are, therefore, moved from the camps to the entrances of shopping malls 
and the political and economic heart of the city.  
Although Shatila and other camps in metropolitan Beirut are not entirely representative of the 
situation of the Palestinian spaces in Lebanon, the idea of the campscape captures the paradox that 
is found in Palestinian camps more broadly in the Middle East. As Puig and Doraï (2012) argue, in the 
urban areas of Tyre, Beirut and Amman, but also Damascus, the camps are starting to become 
integrated within the urban texture and dynamics of the city (Ababsa, 2012; Fadhel, 2012). Yet, their 
legal differentiation from the ‘slum’ is still clear in the ways in which these spaces are governed. 
While in Syria and Jordan refugee camps are controlled and administered by the state’s authorities, 
in Lebanon they experience a dramatised exception as they are governed by Palestinian popular and 
security committees that exercise control only within the camp boundaries (Interview with member 
of the Popular Committee, December 2008).  
The tension between the camp as a solid and exceptional entity and the campscape as a formation 
that indicates fluidity and connection with its outside is, moreover, supported by the perceptions of 
the residents. As emerged from the interviews, Palestinian refugees have a clear sense of where 
camp boundaries lie because of the presence of military checkpoints during the civil war and in its 
aftermath, and the impossibility to build outside Shatila’s boundaries before 1969 when the 
Lebanese police and intelligence services controlled the camps. And yet, despite this clear sense of 
where the camp begins and ends, the absence of fences leads to a virtual extension of the space of 
the camp (Al Husseini, 2012: 48). To the Palestinians the camp (mukhayyam in Arabic) has become a 
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way of life. It is wherever there is a significant presence of Palestinian refugees, be they within or 
beyond Shatila, including the informal settlements surrounding it (Interview with Amina, November 
2008). 
This fluidity of the camp is also reflected in the living conditions that Shatila shares with the areas 
and buildings surrounding it. Both the camp and the settlements around it are characterised by 
overcrowding, lack of adequate services, low-income, low levels of education and general 
deprivation (UN-HABITAT and UNDP, 2010). Those inhabiting the camp are not worse-off if compared 
to those living outside legally or squatting. In this way, Shatila lives a tension between its 
exceptionality as refugee camp and its exclusion from the city centre as part of the ‘slum’. While the 
legal boundaries of the camp matter inasmuch as Palestinians living inside the camp are considered 
‘legal’ while those squatting in adjacent areas risk demolition and eviction every day, these 
distinctions seem to no longer make sense as law and practice blur into each other. 
If, for one moment, we abandon the notion of exception as a legal concept and embrace an 
exception that might be working on economic and social lines, it becomes apparent that the 
distinction between the camp and the slum cannot easily be drawn. As the camp welcomes the 
undesirable and all those excluded from the right to and the space of the city, so does the slum as 
the logic of exclusion expands indefinitely. As the Armenian camps at the beginning of the last 
century constituted points of attraction for those in need and search of better opportunities, so does 
Shatila along with other Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. While the Lebanese authorities’ control 
and engagement in place produced the closure of the camp in the 1950s and 1960s, their 
abandonment allows motion and change: motion, as Palestinians began settling outside the camp 
boundaries especially after the signature of the Cairo Agreements (1969); change, as today the camp 
has turned into a possibility for those who need to hide from the state’s control and who cannot 
afford to live elsewhere. 
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While refugee camps are generally considered ‘holes in time and space’ as the police contain the 
refugees within the camp boundaries and prevent them from ‘leaking out’ and ‘spilling over’ 
(Bauman 2000, 2002), Shatila cannot keep its shape any longer and turns into a ‘liquid’ camp as it 
expands and allows flows in-and-out. Just like the camp inhabitants leak out, so does the exception 
as along with the refugees it includes the citizens and other outcasts. The heterogeneous population 
of the camp meets the diverse residents of the informal settlements as both these spaces host 
Palestinian refugees, Lebanese rural migrants, and the internally displaced, as well as other Arab and 
non-Arab people in the shaping of the ‘campscape’. 
Never has the French word for the term ‘slum’ been so revealing. As Mustafa Dikeç (2007) explains 
the term ‘banlieue’ derives from the word ‘ban’ or, to recall Agamben’s phrase, the inclusive 
exclusion. As Agier (2011: 45) points out, the banlieue is not a place, but a relation. To be banned 
stands for that which is included by virtue of its own exclusion. Attached to the centre but 
abandoned by it, the degraded peripheries of the cities constitute spaces of exclusion and exception 
as regards care, services and effective planning strategies (Gandy, 2006). As the case of Beirut’s 
informal settlements shows, apart from some exceptions – namely the Elissar project that aims at 
the rehabilitation of certain areas of south Beirut – the government and local constituencies do not 
intervene in these areas and they have proven incapable of engaging with it (Fawaz and Peillen, 
2002; Harb, 2001, 2003).  
If once the wall of the city was to produce bare life, today the pulling down of that barrier marks the 
pulling down of clear distinctions and the penetration of the banned into the polis. In Beirut, for 
instance, it is not hard to see poor Shi’ites squatting next to luxurious hotels, awaiting but also 
resisting eviction (Khalaf, 1998). If the camp was born as the localisation of the exception, the link 
holding localisation and ‘disorder’ together has broken down as the supposed-to-be unqualified life 
has climbed over the fence and somehow entered the space of the city. 
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Edkins (2000) posits that Agamben’s focus on the reception of migrants and refugees in western 
countries fails to explore the reasons that lead populations to leave their countries of origins. By 
analysing the countries of destination and the establishment of spaces of exception to contain the 
‘alien’, Agamben seems to miss the causes of displacement and movement, and the ways in which 
life has become expendable elsewhere through neoliberal economies and policies. While Edkins 
speaks of a ‘global liberal governance’ as the ‘contemporary form of biopolitics’, Ong (2006) pushes 
this argument suggesting that neoliberalism has become a technology of governance that unhinges 
our understanding of concepts such as sovereignty and citizenship. The dichotomy between citizen 
and non-citizen seems to no longer make sense as ‘[n]eoliberal governmentality results from the 
infiltration of market-driven truths and calculations into the domain of politics’ (Ong, 2006: 4). While 
Agamben uses the concept of exception ‘as a fundamental principle of sovereign rule predicated on 
the division between citizen in a juridical order and outsiders stripped of juridical political 
protections’ (2006: 5), Ong argues that in contemporary societies biopolitics may operate in much 
more complex terrains that include the market factor. As she puts it, ‘the infiltration of the market 
logic into politics conceptually unsettles the notion of citizenship as a legal status rooted in a nation-
state, and in stark opposition to a condition of statelessness’ (Ong, 2006: 6). We can thus explain 
how citizenship understood as protection generated through a national belonging can change and 
turn into a flexible concept that excludes citizens or includes non-citizens according to market and 
political calculations.  
As Dikeç (2007: 24) stresses, neoliberalism must be understood as ‘a specific form of political 
rationality producing new spaces’. In particular, it manifests itself at the urban level as it increases 
socio-economic inequalities. While urban informalities are understood as spaces hosting the 
excluded and marginalised, echoing Asef Bayat, AlSayyad (2004: 9) suggests that those inhabiting the 
ghetto of Chicago or the favelas of Rio do not lack integration into the system. Quite the contrary, 
they are fully integrated ‘but on terms that often cause them to be economically exploited, politically 
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repressed, socially stigmatised, and culturally excluded’ as a materialisation of the truest and the 
most intimate meaning of ‘ban’. 
As bare life in Beirut is not only represented by the Palestinian refugees, economic and social 
abandonment is applied to other categories of people including Lebanese citizens. The camp is no 
longer the spatial device that separates the refugee from the citizen. It is no longer a closed and 
surveilled space typical of disciplinary obsessions. As state authorities withdraw, physical and 
symbolic boundaries that separate the refugee’s bare life from the allegedly qualified life of the 
citizen blur. As is increasingly the case in other urban centres, we witness ‘greater propinquity in 
social and physical space’ and the formation of the threshold where the refugee/immigrant and 
natives encounter (Wacquant, 1999: 1645). The camp, therefore, escapes the modern illusion of 
creating homogenised spaces as flows bring heterogeneity to the camp and its outside, giving rise to 
the campscape. 
Conclusions 
Agamben’s theory of exception and his position on biopolitics has proved invaluable in 
understanding the ways in which sovereign power operates and in the ways in which bare life is 
produced. However, this article has shown how the adoption of a model of analysis exclusively based 
on law and rights may not exhaust the complexities of biopolitical calculations and bare life 
production. While there are certainly cases in which the concept of the camp may be fully applied as 
a clear-cut space of exception, I argue that the camp imagined by Agamben may not be the only one. 
The camp itself – in its legal understanding and implications – may only partially capture the life that 
the sovereign casts outside the normal juridical order. Starting from a reflection on the entanglement 
of Shatila and informal settlements and the presence of non-Palestinians in the camp, the paper has 
questioned the kind of biopolitics at stake in Lebanon. Secondly, it has questioned the role of Shatila 
refugee camp today and the spatialities of the exception. 
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Abandoning a juridical model that looks at bare life in terms of law and rights, the paper has 
embraced a Foucauldian understanding of the ways in which power may operate beyond legal 
domains. In exploring the exception and its spatialities, the paper has focused on flows and 
openness. It has taken motion, changes and processes as references for an investigation of the 
exception. This approach explained the presence of other kinds of outcasts within Shatila. As the 
Palestinians are stripped of their rights, citizenship and protection, the exception ‘floats’ and is not 
limited to national belonging distinctions. While the first caesura of the population in Lebanon 
divides the Lebanese from the Palestinians, other distinctions run along economic and sectarian 
lines. The latter allows certain Palestinians (the Christians and the upper class) to be included in the 
normal juridical order and even acquire citizenship. At the same time, they also exclude some 
Lebanese citizens from the protection and care their state is supposed to grant them. 
In this context, structures like refugee camps increasingly become sites that are no longer inhabited 
by refugees exclusively as the camp welcomes the multiple outcasts of the Lebanese neoliberal and 
sectarian system. The distinction between the life of the refugee and the qualified political life of the 
citizen gives way to an increasing propinquity of different kinds of banned who share the same 
condition and spaces. As both Palestinians and Lebanese (and other outcasts) live in Shatila as well as 
outside, the exception exceeds the boundaries of the camp to include informal settlements around 
it. This difficulty in localising the space of exception leads me to consider a new spatial model – the 
‘campscape’ – in which refugee camps and informal settlements represent a new enlarged exception. 
Although legally the space of exception is represented by the camp only, life, processes and 
circumstances blur those boundaries. Perhaps an abandonment of spatial disciplinary obsessions has 
led to the leakage of the exception from the space of the camp to its outside. 
This paper demonstrates that political geographers should be ready to embrace new frameworks of 
spatial analysis. The example of Shatila camp, and other Palestinians camps of the Middle East that 
are now part of urban textures, shows how the model of the camp provided by Agamben may not 
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entirely grasp the complexities of these realities. The refugee camp cannot be uncritically accorded 
with the space of exception as described by Agamben for three main reasons. Firstly, refugee camps 
are increasingly becoming permanent solutions to displacement. Rather than seeing refugee camps 
as responding to the logic of emergency or temporariness, there is an urgency to examine these sites 
through the lens of ‘normality’ and as spaces in evolution. An approach that considers the refugee 
camp for its legal aspect only would inevitably miss new forms of living, coping and being political 
that may rise in these spaces. Refugee camps may be considered as productive spaces in evolution 
where new forms of governance can be experimented (Hanafi, 2010). Rather than addressing the 
camps as spaces of exception, we might examine them as laboratories of the politics at the margins, 
the ‘terrain of habitation, livelihood and politics’ where the excluded – be they refugees or other 
outcasts – may reproduce their new normalcy and negotiate their lives (Roy, 2011: 224).  
Secondly, if we consider the exclusion through law, we risk neglecting spaces that deserve equal 
attention because they are placed outside the ‘normal order’ in other ways. This paper has 
problematised the legal prism in approaching the exception. I have argued that the exception does 
not operate on legal tracks only. As Palestinians are legally excluded from the state’s protection, 
other outcasts are produced along other kinds of political, social and economic exclusions. Although 
this research has focused on one refugee camp, Shatila, that has been officially recognised and, as 
such, receives relief and assistance, if we are to investigate lives and spaces that are placed at the 
margins, perhaps researching ‘informal gatherings’ (Palestinian and non-Palestinian) would be 
equally important. The recognition of a formal status (for both refugees and refugee camps) misses 
those who are left out and who are not even entitled to humanitarian assistance. Future 
investigations of the Palestinian lives and camps in Lebanon, for example, might consider the 
condition and the politics of informal gatherings. How are lives and spaces ignored and forgotten by 
formal politics lived?  
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Thirdly, it seems that the refugee camp is not the only spatial referent for refugees. As the UNHCR’s  
(2013) figures show, the spatial order represented by the refugee camp is broken (Sanyal, 2011; 
2012). UNHCR, in fact, estimates that only one third of refugees worldwide (those officially 
considered so) live in refugee camps. Peteet (2011) challenges even more conventional 
understandings of refugeeness by arguing that the novelty of the refugee condition is the non- 
recognition of refugee status and spaces, as in the case of Iraqi refugees in the Middle East or Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon. Acknowledging that new humanitarian and spatial responses may be changing 
certainly has methodological implications for future research. We can no longer assume that the 
‘where’ of the refugee is necessarily the camp. In light of this, future studies may enquire into the 
implications, for refugees, of not living in these spaces. May living outside a refugee camp 
compromise a refugee’s right or desire of return? How are the lives of refugees outside the camp 
negotiated? 
While I do not argue that this kind of evolution in the camp’s meaning and function is a model to be 
uncritically applied to other spaces of exception or the investigation of other refugee camps, I assert 
that the refugee camp is a space in potentiality. Once the exception is declared there is no single 
outcome. As understood by Agamben, it can turn into a space of abjection and, therefore, a 
technology of power aimed at the elimination of the biological threat. But it can also transform into a 
productive space that welcomes other outcasts or in which the inhabitants exploit and mock the 
exceptionality of the camp. The ways in which the camp develops are determined by multiple 
factors. Change can be dictated by the sovereign (Lebanon or other states or suprastate 
organisations intervening in these sites); the circumstances (urban location, for example); or the 
agency of people living in the camp and its proximity. These are actors, events and circumstances 
that cannot always be controlled and guided by the sovereign. 
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